Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the existence of a strong Armenian diaspora in the United States, Georgia's efforts to become an ally of the West, Azerbaijan's energy resources, the region's geopolitical position and its relationship with the Middle East and Eurasia, competition with Russia, reducing Turkey and Iran's influence and ... were among the important reasons for Washington to pay attention to the South Caucasus region. (Photo quoted from Yahoo’s image)

 

The South Caucasus is one of the most volatile regions in the world due to the disputes over Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But the Obama administration's foreign policy strategy in 2009 was interpreted as "leaving the South Caucasus."

 

With Trump taking office, the United States did not increase its presence in the South Caucasus. Therefore, in the US National Security Strategy document in 2017, the South Caucasus was not one of the strategically important regions.

 

The South Caucasus is so far away from the United States and poses few direct threats to Washington. US trade and investment in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is low, and trade with Georgia also remains low. So, over the past decade, the level of US relations with the South Caucasus has not been very high. Thus, US policy in the South Caucasus under the new US administration may not change widely.

 

However, the geopolitical position of the South Caucasus, the influence of a wide range of security threats, the US challenge with countries such as Russia, China and Iran, US relations with the European Union and NATO affect Biden's approach in the Caucasus.

 

It also seems that Joe Biden's administration's attitude towards the South Caucasus region is greatly influenced by the nature of Washington's relations with Moscow. Earlier, Biden expressed concern over the close relations between Russia and Turkey, and noted the need for continued cooperation between the United States and the European Union on the South Caucasus.

 

Therefore, the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may be considered by Washington in the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, instead of the 3 + 3 plan. With US support, Guam could also facilitate the US return to the South Caucasus, along with formulas such as (three South Caucasus countries, the United States and the European Union).

 

In this regard, the increasing US relations with Georgia (the United States' main diplomatic and security partner in the region) and US assistance and diplomatic support will not change, so Tbilisi moves further away from Russia and closer to Europe and NATO. In another dimension, in important areas such as energy, Washington certainly supports the strengthening of reliable energy flows from Azerbaijan, Central Asia through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijani energy through Georgia and Turkey to Europe.

 

In addition, given the Democrats' record of supporting democracy and the political reform process and Biden's commitment to pro-democracy foreign policy with a focus on global values ​​and human rights, it is possible that pursuing of important concepts such as democratic change, welfare, development and security would be on the US agenda, regarding the countries of the South Caucasus.

 

The Trump administration was passive in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war. But Joe Biden was one of the critics of the Trump administration's policy in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. It is important for the United States now that there is no new war and no use of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

 

In fact, although the United States does not support a resolution recognizing the Armenian genocide, it does not want to play a role similar to that of the Trump era, alongside the role of Iran, Russia, and Turkey in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis equations.

 

Farzad Ramezani Bonesh

Senior Researcher and Analyst of International Affairs